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INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental relationships
in any society claiming to be democratic, is the
relationship between state/government (broad-
ly defined) and citizen. Within this relationship
the element of trust is of exceptional signifi-
cance. It is probably safe to say that the extent
to which this relationship and the critical dimen-
sion of trust within it, is under strain, or per-
ceived to be under strain, to a very large extent
influences what happens in other institutional
spheres of society,such as the economic and
educational spheres. It could be argued that
these institutional effects are indirect conse-
quences of the abovementioned relationship and
their impact on the hearts and minds of the peo-
ple involved.
In exploring the dimension of trust in the re-
lationship between government and citizen, it is
important to consider the perception regarding
whether the government of the day is not only
truly committed to protect and enhance, with
integrity and competence, the interests (espe-
cially with reference to safety, justice and order)
of all its citizens - irrespective of race, class, gen-
der and creed - but is also actively involved in
formulating and successfully implementing leg-
islation and policy in such a way that it  will give
effect to this commitment. Distrust in these terms,
therefore refers to an absence of convincing
evidence that a government of the day is in fact
committed in this way to all its citizens. It goes
without saying that trust will be much more of
an issue in heterogeneous societies than in ho-
mogeneous societies.
In a racially and ethnically heterogeneous
country like South Africa, one is therefore likely
to find that the relationship between govern-
ment and citizen becomes much more complicat-
ed and multifaceted. The potential for racially
based sectionalism, ethnic schisms, hidden dis-
crimination and overt disregard for minority in-
terests in a country of this nature, is not only
very real, but also opens up unexpected ave-
nues through which trust in the government of
the day could easily trickle away. Issues like the
struggle to find a new identity clearly intensify
these issues. Soudien (2001: 313) testifies to ex-
actly this kind of struggle in identity formation
amongst young people in different South Afri-
can schools and comments that schools as the
“Official embodiment in the symbolism of the
state … offer complex opportunities for young
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people to receive and make identity. This pro-
cess of receiving and making … generates iden-
tities that are profoundly heterogeneous, con-
tradictory and susceptible to change”.
In its 2014 Youth Report, Pondering Panda
used a mobile phone survey1to interview 199 589
young people between the ages of 13 and 34
about their hope for the future in South Africa
after the death of Nelson Mandela. Pondering
Panda summarised the striking difference in their
sentiments compared to the previous Youth Hope
Index (2012) they conducted prior to his death:
“Young people were more pessimistic about the
future, and were significantly more concerned
with corruption and politics than they had been
before. However, their overriding concern re-
mained unemployment, and crime was still a sig-
nificant issue” (Pondering Panda Youth Report
2014: 49).
An earlier study by Pondering Panda (No-
vember 2012) questioning 2606 South African
respondents between the ages of 18-34, showed
a dramatic increase in the number of South Afri-
can youth who wanted to leave South Africa of
36 per cent compared to 25 per cent only three
months before. The report also revealed strong
racial differences with 56 per cent of Whites and
53 per cent of Indians expressing a desire to em-
igrate, compared to significantly lower percent-
ages of Coloured (43%) and Black (33%) respon-
dents.  Respondents with a higher standard of
living (LSM groups 7 to 10) were also more likely
to want to leave (42%) (Pondering Panda, Me-
dia Release, 20 November 2012:  np).
Shirley Wakefield, spokesperson for Ponder-
ing Panda, highlights a major dilemma reflected
in this finding: “What is also of grave concern is
that those most likely to leave are those most
likely to have the skills that we so desperately
need. Members of higher socio-economic groups
are most likely to want to emigrate … it reveals a
state of mind of wanting to get out of South Af-
rica, due to poor prospects for its long-term fu-
ture. It is probable that this sentiment will be
reflected in higher emigration figures in the years
ahead, exacerbating our skills shortage”. (Pon-
dering Panda, Media Release, 20 November
2012: np).  This issue is of particular concern
when considering the views of university stu-
dents as they will represent an important cohort
of the population with above average skills sets
upon completion of their studies.
This paper therefore explores the following
question: How do their views of the govern-
ment impact on the desire of undergraduate
students of the University of Johannesburg (UJ)
to remain in the country? This implies a look
into the heart of the relationship between citizen
and government within the South African
context.
How students respond to the perceived neg-
ative features of the new South Africa is mediat-
ed firstly by the degree of trust they have in the
government’s ability, and willingness to deal
constructively with the negative elements that
characterise South African society, and second-
ly by the various ways in which students might
engage or disengage these perceived or real
negatives.
Literature dealing with these two elements
of trust and engagement will briefly be dis-
cussed so as to develop a typology in terms of
which the data pertaining to UJ students will be
analysed.
The Trust/Distrust Continuum
Clearly, the dimension of trust can vary on a
continuum ranging from trust to distrust. One
would therefore expect that levels of trust/dis-
trust could vary over time within a particular
society as a whole, or within a particular seg-
ment of the population forming part of a given
society. Various and varying degrees of trust/
distrust could therefore permeate and charac-
terise the same society at a particular point in
time.
In terms of political socialisation theory, loy-
alty to civic leaders and the polity they repre-
sent,  according to Easton and Dennis, “…flows
from the young child’s sense of basic trust in
the benevolence of those leaders…that is, his
or her belief that they ruled with the child’s best
interests in mind” (in a chapter by Flanagan 2004).
Extrapolated into adulthood, one could validly
argue that trust (especially in a heterogeneous
society) would for all citizens translate into a
belief that they (leaders and government) ruled
with the best interests of all citizens in mind and
would do so with integrity and competence.
The extent of trust students experience, is
prominent in especially the following two areas:
Firstly, their perceptions of economic prospects
(that is, the likelihood of finding a job or build-
ing a career in South Africa), and secondly, per-
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ceptions of safety and security in South Africa.
Stated differently, these factors could be formu-
lated in the following way: Firstly: “To what ex-
tent can the South African government be trust-
ed to create conditions that facilitate an open,
expanding and fair job-market to all its citizens?”
and secondly: “To what extent can the South
African government be trusted to ensure the
safety and security of all its citizens?” The pos-
sible responses of students to these trust-relat-
ed perceptions are taken to manifest primarily in
various degrees of an engaging or disengaging
response in facing and dealing with these
challenges.
A recent survey amongst students at uni-
versities in the DRC, South Africa, Lesotho and
Malawi by Sadie (2012:151), found high levels
of distrust ranging between 24% and 75% with
reference to government institutions and issues
of governance in the different countries. Sixteen
of the 28 measures (seven per each of the four
countries) reflected levels of distrust towards
the respective governments of 50% and higher.
With regard to economic prospects, the ma-
jority of South African students, Black and
White, blamed the South African government
for failing to address problems of crime and a
lack of security adequately. While the majority
of White students considered the government’s
lack of success in dealing with the problem of
HIV/AIDS as the second most important issue,
Black students were mostly concerned about
the creation of jobs. Both racial groups viewed
“…the government to be unsuccessful in ad-
dressing the issue of illegal immigrants and
eradicating poverty” (2012: 155).  On the issue
of safety and security, only 33% of South Afri-
can students involved in the study indicated
that they trusted the South African Police Ser-
vices, while 64% expressed explicit distrust of
this internal security arm of the Government
(2012: 151).
Louw (1997: 137), in exploring trends and
perceptions of crime in South Africa, indicated
that crime “…causes widespread feelings of in-
security and fear …” and that this “…under-
mines popular confidence in the democratiza-
tion process”. This once again raises the issue
of trust in the South African government’s abil-
ity to contain crime successfully.  Shaw and Gas-
trow (2001: 255) show that crime in post-apart-
heid South Africa is lowering the confidence in
the new democratic order for Whites, and for
the majority of  South Africans, crime under-
mines the promise that democracy brought of a
better life.  Powdthavee (2005: 542) indicated that
increased crime leads to significantly lower lev-
els of wellbeing in SA amongst victims of crime
compared to non-victims, and lower levels of
perceived quality of life also result from crime
on others. This is confirmed by Møller (2005)
who found that “fear of crime” and “concern for
personal safety” had a negative influence on
life satisfaction amongst respondents in the East-
ern Cape Province of South Africa.
Pondering Panda’s mobile phone survey
(2014) unequivocally displays young people’s
sentiments in this regard:
Young South Africans do not have a high
opinion of the SAPS. A significant majority (es-
pecially older and higher LSM groups) believe
police in South Africa are mostly dishonest and
corrupt, and they’re most likely to say they don’t
feel good about them. Feeling safe is a big is-
sue for young South Africans, and they feel less
safe at home than they do at school. About a
fifth say they never feel safe in the area where
they live. And as for the police making it safer?
With only about a quarter believing police do
their best to catch criminals, it’s clear that young
people do not feel that they can rely on police,
either to protect them or to make their neigh-
bourhood safer (2014: 44).
It is thus glaringly clear that issues of safety
and security are closely related to doubts about
economic prospects in South Africa, as many
South Africa citizens leave or consider leaving
the country due to the levels of crime pervading
the South  Africa social landscape. This is con-
firmed by Sadie (2012: 160) who found that six
out of ten students in South Africa consider leav-
ing South Africa after completing their studies.
Looking at crime and perceptions after two
decades of democracy in South Africa and high-
lighting differences in perceptions amongst dif-
ferent groups in South Africa, Louw (2007: 252)
emphasises that these concerns go deeper and
affect identity issues of different segments of
the South African population: “The deep divi-
sions in public perceptions of crime and safety
can also be linked to views of governance in
general (not just in the areas of safety and jus-
tice), which in turn have been associated with
issues of identity and political inclusion”. This
is reflected in the race and class differences ev-
ident in evaluations of governance aimed at
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creating a climate conducive to improvements
with regard to a wide range of areas such as job
creation, basic health services and educational
needs (Louw 2007: 252).
The Engagement/Disengagement Continuum
Regardless of the extent of trust or distrust
that characterises the relationship between state/
government and citizen, the concept that per-
haps most accurately describes the response of
the trusting or distrusting citizen in these cir-
cumstances, is “engagement”. Broadly speak-
ing, engagement/disengagement in effect refers
to either progressively being involved in soci-
etal challenges based on the hope that this en-
gagement will result in a significant improvement
in the challenging societal conditions, or pro-
gressively withdrawing from societal challeng-
es based on the lack of hope that engagement
will result in significant improvement of the chal-
lenging societal conditions.
In the school context,Wilms (2003: 8) identi-
fies the following as the essence of engagement:
“identify with….to value….and participate in”.
Applying these to a country like South Africa
on a national level, would imply that South Afri-
cans “identify with, value and participate in” the
South African social system in order to contrib-
ute to improved living conditions for all. Disen-
gagement would entail the opposite.
People could on the one hand become so
overwhelmed by these threats that they start
engaging the situation to the extent of going to
the dangerous and desperate extreme of taking
the law into their own hands.  This happens es-
pecially where they perceive the government,
through its police force, to be either unwilling,
unable or both to do something effectively to
contain crime. Shaw and Gastrow refer to Ma-
pogo a Matamaga and PAGAD as South Afri-
can examples of vigilante groups going to this
extreme (2001: 254-255). Some people may sim-
ply disengage from what they believe to be an
intolerably unpleasant reality.
This paper argues that South Africans re-
spond to bleak economic prospects and crime
by either engaging the problem or disengaging
themselves from the problem.  Furthermore, trust
or lack of trust in the government and the future
of South Africa plays an equally important role
in the way people react to these problems.
Typology of Possible Responses to Perceived
Threats
For the purposes of this paper, the relation-
ship between the dimensions/dynamisms of trust
and engagement will be constructed in the fol-
lowing way: First of all, the two dynamisms from
the average citizen’s point of view, are to be un-
derstood within the following context:
? A country is faced with problems or chal-
lenges, and the prime responsibility to deal
with a particular problem or challenge is
taken to be that of the country’s govern-
ment;
? The government then to some extent deals
with the problem or challenge ranging from
competently and fairly, up to failing to deal
with problems or challenges at all;
? Citizens (as individuals or members of par-
ticular sectors, organisations, or move-
ments within broader society) look on or
participate in this process and then based
on the outcome of the government-led or
government’s intervention, conclude that
that particular government can either be
trusted to competently and fairly deal with
societal problems or challenges, or cannot
be trusted.
Secondly, based on this contextual scenar-
io, the average citizen then concludes that en-
gagement with major stakeholders and process-
es in this particular society is either a worth-
while endeavour, or not, resulting in either en-
gagement or disengagement.  One could per-
haps argue that the lower the levels of trust, the
less constructive the engagement will be, where-
as higher levels of trust will be more likely to
result in more constructive engagements from
the government’s perspective. With reference
to the former response one could argue that
some citizens could choose to “help” or “as-
sist” the government to do its job.
Superimposing trust in and engagement with
each other, provide an interesting typology of
responses as reflected in Table l.
In terms of the typology it is clear that peo-
ple could either respond to real or perceived
threats on the basis of trust in the government’s
ability and willingness to protect their interests
as citizens and the derived trust in the future of
the country, or from a position of distrust in this
regard.
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On this basis they could furthermore either
engage in the threatening reality or disengage
from it altogether.  Four possible responses thus
emerge:
1. Trusting engagement
2. Trusting disengagement
3. Distrusting engagement
4. Distrusting disengagement
Response one (trusting engagement) is ob-
viously the most preferable response for the
wellbeing of any country as it implies involve-
ment in seeking solutions – within the bound-
aries of conventional institutions - out of a posi-
tion of trust in the government and the future of
the country, the assumption being that the gov-
ernment is worthy and deserving of this trust.
Without discounting the critical importance of
community involvement in addressing societal
challenges, the fact remains that government
bears the ultimate responsibility in this regard.
Response two (trusting disengagement) is
probably the least harmful. It could however
deny the country valuable and creative inputs
in the fight against society’s problems when cit-
izens opt for this response.
Of the responses identified in the typology,
response three (distrusting engagement) prob-
ably poses the greatest threat to the long-term
stability and prosperity of any country and there-
fore also of South Africa.
Response four (distrusting disengagement)
could in a certain sense cause a country to de-
velop socio-economic anorexia due to an out-
flow of knowledge and skills. South African stu-
dents considering such an option could con-
tribute to just such an outflow of knowledge
and skills.
The Desire to Emigrate
From the above motivations, it is clear that
one way of responding to the problem, is to dis-
engage oneself from the situation in a geograph-
ical sense, that is by emigrating to another coun-
try.  In a study on countries across the globe,
Dutta and Roy established how
…political instability can be an important
reason for the skilled labour force of an econo-
my to move to other countries. Our detailed
analysis reveal that relative conditions of gov-
ernment stability, socio-economic condition,
investment profile, democratic accountability,
internal conflict, and ethnic tension in coun-
tries are important for the retention of a skilled
workforce in the domestic country…..Thus, to
retain this invaluable section of the popula-
tion, the government should strive to provide
them and the country as a whole with sound
political conditions (2011: 454).
Looking at emigration from Germany, Uebelm-
esser (2006: 226) shows that the probable emi-
grants are young, with an above-average school
level, and without school children causing a brain
drain of people with above average capabilities.
Similarly, with reference to people with more than
average skills and their reasons for wanting to
leave, Monteleone and Torrisi (2012) found that
among 4700 Italian researchers (assistant pro-
fessors), that the brain drain can generally be
linked to dissatisfaction with the economic and
social situation of the country.
Two other authors, van Dalen and Henkens
(2007: 58), with reference to emigration inten-
tions of native born inhabitants of the Nether-
lands, found that the “…potential migrant is pre-
dominantly young, better educated, with a high
Table 1: Typology of possible responses to perceived threats
Engagement Disengagement
Trusting Trusting Engagement Trusting Disengagement
• Involved solution seeking • Relaxed anticipation that others will• Economic and social development initiatives1 find solutions
• Primary involvement in ordinary
everyday activities
1 2
Distrusting Distrusting Engagement Distrusting Disengagement
• Benign responses (for example, BAC) • Alienation/fatalism/re-treatism
• Usurp responses (for example, Pagadand • Slumbering anger
Mapogo previously) • Early retirement
• Other self-defence postures (for example, • Emigration (geographically or
buying weapons) psychologically)
   3 4
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income, and with family or friends abroad”. Three
elements in the public domain, implying lowered
trust, relating to social problems such as crime,
pollution and ethnic conflict, environmental prob-
lems e.g. increasing population density and in-
stitutional shortcomings in dealing with welfare
and social problems in the educational, social
security, health care, law and order and old-age
pension domains, play a role in decisions to
emigrate. All of these relate to perceptions of
the Dutch Government having become increas-
ingly negative in recent years (2007: 58).
In a study on four African countries (Ghana,
Senegal, Morocco and Egypt) van Dalen et al.
(2005: 775) found that great expectations of an
economic nature were the predominant pull fac-
tor, while poverty and unemployment represent-
ed the dominant push factor for young males
with modern values. Having a household mem-
ber who has been an international migrant or
was still a migrant, also played an important role
in intentions to migrate.
METHODOLOGY
In 2011, the Sociology Department at the
University of Johannesburg (UJ) conducted a
survey among undergraduate students on all
four UJ campuses exploring their experiences as
members of various student communities. The
fieldwork was performed by postgraduate UJ
students who conducted face-to-face structured
interviews with 1214 students questioning them
about a variety of issues related to their experi-
ences as UJ students.
The distribution of the sample adequately
represents the 2011 student population in terms
of numbers registered on the different campus-
es – and in terms of race and gender. The major-
ity of the respondents were based at the Auck-
land Park Campus (590), while sizable groups
were interviewed at the Bunting Road Campus
(255), the Doornfontein Campus (215) and the
Soweto Campus (154). Approximately 80% of the
undergraduate students interviewed were Black,
12% White, 6% Indian and 2% Coloured. With
regard to sex, 47% (569) were male and 53% (645)
female students. The mean age was 21 years
and the median stood at 20. Approximately 93%
were South Africans, 5% from other SADC coun-
tries and 2% from the rest of Africa.
RESULTS
Scale Construction
For purposes of this paper two scales were
constructed. One scale measured levels of trust
in the government and the other, the levels of
commitment or engagement of students to South
Africa.  Factor analyses were conducted on the
following items:
To what extent…
…do you think the SA government is con-
taining crime successfully?
…do you feel included in the democratic pro-
cesses in South Africa?
…do you trust the South African govern-
ment?
…do you feel safe in SA?
…do you like living in SA?
…do you feel that you belong in South
Africa?
…do you feel patriotic towards SA?
…are you optimistic about the future of SA?
…do you think you are likely to get a job in
SA?
…do you think that corruption is a serious
problem in South Africa?
…do you feel safe on campus?
The Kayser-Meyer-Olkin(KMO)Measure of
Sampling Adequacy was .836 which exceeds the
requirement of .6 and meant that there was suf-
ficient correlation between pairs of items to pro-
ceed with the factor analysis.  Similarly, the Bar-
tlett’s Test of Sphericity confirmed that it was
feasible to proceed.  However, the Measure of
Sampling Adequacy (MSA) for one item was
lower than .6 (to what extent do you think that
corruption is a serious problem in South Afri-
ca?), and this item was therefore removed from
further analysis.  Two factors had Eigenvalues
larger than 1 and were retained.  The rotated
factor matrix appears in Table 2. The two factors
therefore consisted of the following items as re-
flected in Tables 3 and 4:
Both factors were then subjected to an item
analysis to determine the reliability of the scale.
The initial Cronbach alpha of the Engagement
factor was 0.757 and when the item “to what
extent do you feel safe on campus” was removed
from the analysis, the Cronbach alpha increased
to 0.766.  An engagement scale was therefore
constructed containing the following items as
reflected in Table 5.
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With a Cronbach alpha of 0.685 the trust fac-
tor was not reliable. Removal of the item “to what
extent do you feel included in the democratic pro-
cesses in South Africa” increased the Cronbach
alpha to 0.694.  Although this is slightly below
the required level of 0.7, it is close enough so that
the scale could be used and the trust scale there-
fore reflects the following (see Table 6).
Level of Engagement
The level of engagement experienced by the
respondents is reflected in Figure 1.  The mean
of 3.67 (median=3.8) shows that the majority of
the respondents displayed a relatively high lev-
el of engagement.
No significant differences were found be-
tween male and female students with regard to
level of engagement.  Significant differences were
found between Black African students on the
one hand and White and Coloured students on
Table 2: Rotated factor matrix
Factor
       1        2
To what extent do you feel that you belong in South Africa? .773
To what extent do you like living in SA? .712
To what extent do you feel patriotic towards SA? .553
To what extent are you optimistic about the future of SA? .483
To what extent do you think you are likely to get a job in SA? .435
To what extent do you feel safe on campus? .290
To what extent do you trust the South African government? .730
To what extent do you think the SA government is containing crime successfully? .584
To what extent do you feel safe in SA? .564
To what extent do you feel included in the democratic processes in South Africa? .356
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization with rotation  converging in 3 iterations.
Table 3: Factor 1 Engagement
To what extent do you like living in SA?
To what extent do you feel patriotic towards SA?
To what extent are you optimistic about the
  future of SA?
To what extent do you think you are likely to
  get a job in SA?
To what extent do you feel safe on campus?
Table 4: Factor 2 Trust
To what extent do you trust the South African
  government?
To what extent do you think the SA government is
  containing crime successfully?
To what extent do you feel safe in SA?
To what extent do you feel included in the democratic
  processes in South Africa?
Table 5: Scale 1 Engagement
To what extent do you feel that you belong in South
   Africa?
To what extent do you like living in SA?
To what extent do you feel patriotic towards SA?
To what extent are you optimistic about the future of
  SA?
To what extent do you think you are likely to get a
  job in SA?
Table 6: Scale 2 Trust
To what extent do you trust the South African
  government?
To what extent do you think the SA government is
  containing crime successfully?
To what extent do you feel safe in SA?
Fig. 1. Level of engagement
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the other.  Black African students were the most
engaged, followed by Indian/Asian and White
students, with Coloured students being the least
engaged.  This result is shown in Table 7. The
Dunnett T3 post-hoc test revealed that Black
African students displayed significantly higher
levels of engagement than White and Coloured
students.
Extent of trust in government
The distribution of the extent of trust in gov-
ernment is shown in Figure 2.  The respondents
displayed an average level of trust in the govern-
ment with a mean of 2.46 and a median of 2.67.
Male students placed significantly more trust
in government than female students, as is shown
in Table 8.
The students’ level of trust in government
follows a similar pattern with regard to race dif-
ferences with Black African students showing
the highest level of trust, followed by Indian/
Asian and White students, with Coloured stu-
dent displaying the lowest level of trust as shown
in Table 9.
With regard to trust, the respondents were
also requested to indicate the extent to which
they felt included in democratic processes as is
shown in Table 10.  A substantial proportion of
the students did not feel included in democratic
processes (40.8%), and only 23.3 per cen tre-
garded themselves as fully included in the dem-
ocratic processes.  Male and female students
did not differ significantly with regard to the
level of inclusion they experienced.
The different race groups again showed sig-
nificant differences as is evident from Table 11.
It is significant that only 25.3% of Black African
students felt fully included in the democratic
process of the country.  This was followed by
17.9 per cent of Indian/Asians and 14.9% of
White students, while less than ten per cent of
Table 7: Race and engagement
 N     Mean
Black African 969 3.7412
Indian/Asian 67 3.6075
White 148 3.3541
Coloured 26 3.0462
Total 1210 3.6715
F=16.092, degrees of freedom=3, p<0.0005
Fig. 2. Extent of trust in government
Table 8: Sex and trust in government
Are you male N Mean     Std
or female? Deviation
Male 568 2.5141 .84254
Female 643 2.4137 .81370
t=2.107; p=0.035
Table 9: Race and trust in government
N     Mean
Black 970 2.5739
White 148 1.9032
Coloured 26 1.8846
Indian/Asian 67 2.2786
Total 1211 2.4608
F=36.614; degrees of freedom=3; p<0.0005
Table 10: Level of inclusion in democratic processes
Frequency Per cent   Valid per cent Cumulative per cent
Not included 493 40.6 40.8 40.8
Reasonably included 434 35.7 35.9 76.7
Fully included 281 23.1 23.3 100.0
Total 1208 99.5 100.0
Missing 6 .5
1214 100.0
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Coloured students (7.7%) felt that they were ful-
ly included in the democratic processes.
Engagement and Trust
It is also important to consider the extent to
which a correlation exists between the level of
engagement that students displayed and their
level of trust in government.  The Pearson’s Prod-
uct Moment Correlation Coefficient produced a
significant correlation of 0.462.  This indicates
that a moderate relationship exists between the
students’ level of engagement and their level of
trust in government.
Desire to Settle in another Country
A discouragingly high number of respon-
dents is either contemplating, or definitely think-
ing of leaving the country after they have com-
pleted their studies, as is shown in Table 12.
Again no significant differences were found
between male and female students with regard
to their desire to settle in another country after
completing their studies.  A cross-tabulation of
race and desire to leave revealed significant dif-
ferences between the four race groups, as is
shown in Table 13. Coloured (57.7%) and White
(47.3%) students were significantly more likely
to consider settling in another country than Black
African (32.2%) and Indian/Asian (40.9%)
students.
It was also important to determine whether
the extent of students’ desire to settle in another
country after completion of their studies could
be attributed to their level of engagement, or the
amount of trust they have in government.  No
significant differences were found with regard
to the level of inclusion in democratic processes
experienced by the students.  The extent to
which students considered settling in another
country was significantly influenced by their
level of engagement and their level of trust in
government as is revealed in Table 14.  The high-
er the level of trust in government and the high-
er their level of engagement, the less likely stu-
dents would be to consider leaving the country.
The Dunnett T3 test showed that all three groups
of Settling in another country differ significant-
ly from each other with regard to Level of en-
gagement, while in the case of Trust in govern-
ment, those who were not considering leaving
differed significantly from those who were defi-
nitely leaving.
Table 11: Race *inclusion in democratic processes
Inclusion in democratic processes    Total
   Not Reasonably   Fully
included  included included
Black African Count 367 355 245 967
% within race 38.0% 36.7% 25.3% 100.0%
% within inclusion in democratic processes 74.4% 81.8% 87.2% 80.0%
White Count 80 46 22 148
% within race 54.1% 31.1% 14.9% 100.0%
% within inclusion in democratic processes 16.2% 10.6% 7.8% 12.3%
Coloured Count 20 4 2 26
% within race 76.9% 15.4% 7.7% 100.0%
% within inclusion in democratic processes 4.1% 0.9% 0.7% 2.2%
Indian/Asian Count 26 29 12 67
% within race 38.8% 43.3% 17.9% 100.0%
% within inclusion in democratic processes 5.3% 6.7% 4.3% 5.5%
Total Count 493 434 281 1208
% within race 40.8% 35.9% 23.3% 100.0%
% within inclusion in democratic processes 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
χ2=31.675; degrees of f=6; p<0.0005
Table 12: Considering settling in another country
N  Per cent
Not considering 410 33.9
Contemplating 374 31.0
Definitely 424 35.1
Total 1208 100.0
Missing 6
Total 1214
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DISCUSSION
The results indicated a moderate relationship
between trust and engagement suggesting a
concomitant variation between these two vari-
ables: the higher the one, the higher the other
would be inclined to go, and vice versa. This
study showed that trust in government is aver-
age to low among the respondents, especially
with reference to feeling included in the demo-
cratic process in South Africa, and particularly
amongst Black African students. This corre-
sponds with the findings of Sadie (2012). In her
case lack of trust was linked to a shortage of
jobs and safety and security concerns not dealt
with effectively by governments in Southern
Africa.In the sample of  this study, the lowest
level of trust was found amongst Coloureds, fol-
lowed by Whites, Indian/Asians with Black Af-
rican students displaying the highest level of
trust.  Interestingly enough, the only variable
where a significant difference between male and
female students was found, was trust in govern-
ment, with male students trusting the govern-
ment significantly more than female students.
In contrast, the majority of the students dem-
onstrated a relatively high level of engagement
in South Africa with Black African students be-
ing significantly more engaged thanWhite or
Coloured students.  Looking at the items on the
scale of engagement (I like living in SA, I have a
feeling of belonging in SA, I feel patriotic to-
wards SA, I am optimistic about the future of SA
and I believe that it is likely that I will find a job),
most students are clearly displaying an engag-
ing orientation towards South Africa, its future
and their place therein.
CONCLUSION
While the findings suggested that the ma-
jority of the students had an average to low lev-
el of trust in the government, they simultaneous-
Table 13: Race *settling in another country cross-tabulation
      Settling in another country
Not consi- Contem- Definitely        Total
dering it plating it
Black African Count 351 305 312 968
% within race 36.3% 31.5% 32.2% 100.0%
% within settling in another country 85.6% 81.6% 73.6% 80.1%
White Count 33 45 70 148
% within race 22.3% 30.4% 47.3% 100.0%
% within settling in another country 8.0% 12.0% 16.5% 12.3%
Coloured Count 6 5 15 26
% within race 23.1% 19.2% 57.7% 100.0%
% within settling in another country 1.5% 1.3% 3.5% 2.2%
Indian/Asian Count 20 19 27 66
% within race 30.3% 28.8% 40.9% 100.0%
% within settling in another country 4.9% 5.1% 6.4% 5.5%
Total Count 410 374 424 1208
% within race 33.9% 31.0% 35.1% 100.0%
% within settling in another country 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
χ2=22.930; df=6; p=0.001
Table 14: ANOVA of extent of trust in government and engagement*settling in another country
N   Mean       F             Significance
Extent of Not considering it 410 2.6293 22.094 0.000
Trust in Government Contemplating it 373 2.5004
Definitely 424 2.2602
Total 1207 2.4598
Engagement Not considering it 409 3.9398 47.923 0.000
Contemplating it 373 3.6702
Definitely 424 3.4137
Total 1206 3.6715
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ly displayed a high level of engagement in South
Africa. Combining these two findings (distrust
and engagement) would, in terms of the typolo-
gy, place students at UJ generally speaking in
cell number 3,where the orientation is one of
“distrusting engagement”. In spite of the gener-
al distrust that students display, they neverthe-
less express this paradoxical combination of dis-
trust and engagement in a benign way that
is,seeing themselves as part of a country they
feel patriotic towards and seeing a future for
themselves in South Africa.There is a danger,
though, that the currently benign response of
the “distrusting engaging” kind could in the long
run (if distrust were to intensify and alienation
and anger were to increase) be transformed into
a “distrusting disengagement” kind of orienta-
tion (cell 4 of the typology). The consequences
for South Africa of such a drift could be very
negative.
To some extent, this drift towards distrust-
ing disengagement (as manifested inter alia in
the desire to leave South Africa) seems to be at
work already among students when looking at
the proportion of respondents considering
toleave South Africa. As far as the question of
staying or leaving is concerned, only one third
of the students indicated that they are not con-
sidering settling in another country after com-
pletion of their studies. This means that almost
two thirds of participants in this study are al-
ready in the “distrusting disengagement” mode.
Coloured and White students were more likely
to consider leaving than Black students. The
results also showed that the lower their trust in
government the more likely students are to con-
sider leaving, and the more engaged they are in
South Africa the less likely they are to consider
leaving.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This study demonstrated two overriding pri-
orities for the South African government if the
new South Africa is to become the success sto-
ry we all hope it will be. First, crime and econom-
ic issues need to be addressed effectively and
visibly in order to discourage the growing and
dangerous socio-political vortex of distrusting
citizens engaging threats themselves, or disen-
gaging from these threats, by emigrating.The
second challenge for the South African govern-
ment is to conduct its affairs in such a way that
levels of trust among the youth in general, and
students in particular, will rise, so that the rela-
tively high levels of engagement will be har-
nessed to the benefit of South Africa, while also
lowering the desire to leave the country, and
thereby reducing the detrimental effects of the
brain drain.
The implications of the four responses for
the long-term stability and prosperity of South
Africa constitute enough substance for a sepa-
rate and new paper and will therefore not be ex-
plored any further here.
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NOTE
1. As explained in the index to the report Pondering
Panda (2014) employed their social network Mx-
it’s respondent base in conducting interviews via
mobile phones through an interactive app. In order
to ensure national representivity responses were
weighted in terms of age, gender and race.
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